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Abstract: We investigate the effects of power on cooperation in repeated social dilemma 
settings. Groups of five players play either multi-player trust games or VCM-games on a 
fixed network. Power stems from having the authority to allocate funds raised through 
voluntary contributions by all members and/or from having a pivotal position in the network 
(centrality). We compare environments with and without ostracism by allowing players in 
some treatments to exclude others from further participation in the network. Our results show 
that power matters but that its effects hinge strongly on the type involved. Reminiscent of the 
literature on leadership, players with authority often act more cooperatively than those 
without such power. Nevertheless, when possible, they are quickly ostracized from the group. 
Thus, this kind of power is not tolerated by the powerless. In stark contrast, centrality leads to 
less cooperative behavior and this free riding is not punished; conditional on cooperativeness, 
players with power from centrality are less likely to be ostracized than those without. Hence, 
not only is this type of power tolerated, but so is the free riding it leads to.  
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“Nearly all men can stand adversity, but if you want to test a man’s character, give him power.” 
attributed to Abraham Lincoln 
 
1 Introduction 
It has long been a widely shared ‘truism’ that the possession of power leads to the dilution of 
an individual’s moral character (see DeCelles et al. 2012 and the references therein). A 
famous example is the abuse of power by ‘prison guards’ in the 1971 Stanford prison 
experiment (Zimbardo 2000). A common presumption is that the actions of powerful 
individuals will be more strongly motivated by self-interest than the actions of others (e.g., 
Persson et al. 2003). Such self-interested behavior is often harmful to society at large. Indeed, 
due to the belief that “power is apt to corrupt the minds of those who possess it” (William Pitt 
the Elder, 1848:94) many social and public bodies are designed to divide authority and 
responsibility among individuals and across levels within the institution. 
Little is known, however, about the relationship between having power and an 
increase in self-interested actions. Moreover, different sources of power may have distinct 
effects. Even if they have similar effects on individuals with power, those without may 
respond differently to the (ab)use of distinct kinds of power. In this paper we will focus on 
what we believe are two of the main sources of power: (i) control over the allocation of 
surplus and (ii) a pivotal position in society or an organization. The power to allocate surplus 
(authority) is observed in many organizations, ranging from wage determination in small 
firms to government spending at the national level. Power through centrality arises when 
someone’s presence is vital for keeping a group together. For example, centrality may arise in 
networks due to social connections, particular skills or location. Think of a firm where one 
team leader brings together two teams with diverse skill sets. Or geographically, if several 
nations or regions want to collaborate but can only do so if a centrally located region is 
involved.  
Though it is widely believed that power ‘corrupts’, it is difficult to obtain empirical 
validation of this belief because reliable data are difficult to obtain in the field (for one thing, 
because most people do not like to report that they have been affected in this way). We will 
use the laboratory to collect data that will allow us to investigate the consequences of 
introducing asymmetries in power. We choose an environment where there is a tension 
between one’s own interest and the common good, to wit, cooperation in social dilemma 
games. An important advantage of our approach is that cooperation and free riding in social 
dilemmas are phenomena that are well understood.  
We thus aim to better understand the effects of power asymmetries in social dilemma 
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games. We investigate whether and how power affects cooperative behavior, distinguishing 
between power from authority and power from centrality. We ask both how having power 
affects one’s actions and how others (without power) respond to this. For the response to 
power abuse, we study the potential of one mechanism in particular – ostracism of group 
members – to counterbalance the negative effects of power. Specifically, we address three 
research questions in this paper: (i) How is cooperative behavior affected by having power? 
(ii) How do players without power respond to power asymmetries? (iii) Does the abuse of 
power and the use of ostracism vary between power from authority and power from 
centrality? 
To create power asymmetry in a social dilemma, we impose an exogenous network 
structure. This allows us to create, in a natural way, the two types of power that we are 
interested in. To create power derived from authority, subjects play a five-player game of 
trust where one player has discretion over how the surplus created by voluntary contributions 
is distributed among the members of the group. This is compared to a classic voluntary 
contribution mechanism (VCM), where every player automatically receives an equal share of 
the group surplus. Other than this difference in how proceeds are distributed, the two games 
are equivalent.  
To see how people react to power asymmetries in their groups, in some treatments, 
we allow players the opportunity to ostracize others using a majority-voting rule (as in 
Cinyabuguma et al. 2005). Excluding people from a group is an obvious way in which abuse 
of power can be addressed. Think of voting out a politician or removing all social ties with a 
corrupt leader. In this way, ostracism may be a strong tool in the hands of the powerless to 
counteract the abuse of power.  
The opportunity to ostracize group members also allows us to investigate power from 
centrality. This occurs in networks where one or a few pivotal players are essential for 
keeping the network connected.1 Sociologists have long known that such centrality produces 
power in networks (Bonacich, 1987). The essence of power through centrality is intuitive; 
leaving out the central player causes the network to fall apart, which is a costly act for other 
actors involved. For this reason, power though centrality may lead to what anthropologists 
call ‘tolerated theft’ (e.g., Blurton Jones, 1984, in a different context). This occurs when 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Centrality in a network can be characterized by maximal betweenness, nearness, degree and influence 
(Freeman, 1979; Jackson, 2008). Betweenness measures the frequency with which a point (i.e., player) in a 
network falls between pairs of other points. Nearness is defined by the distance of a point to all other points in 
the network. A point’s degree measures the number of other points it is connected to. Influence is closely related 
to betweenness and measures the fraction of the network that is affected by changes in a point (e.g., decisions by 
a player). 
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agents allow others to take advantage of their social position. As far as we are aware, this 
hypothesis has hitherto not been systematically studied in the economic and game-theoretic 
literature. Moreover, even if theft by those with power through centrality is indeed tolerated, 
it remains an open question whether the same holds for other forms of power. 
The introduction of players with either type of power creates heterogeneity across 
players in the social dilemmas that we study. This in itself may affect cooperation. Whereas 
most work on social dilemmas has focused on homogeneous groups, there are notable 
exceptions, starting with the seminal work of Ostrom et al. (1994). Players can be 
heterogeneous in terms of endowments (Cherry et al. 2005), marginal productivity (Tan, 
2008; Tan & Noussair, 2011) and marginal benefits (Fisher et al. 1995), for example. How 
heterogeneity affects cooperation between different types of players and at the group level 
depends on the particulars of the game (see Reuben and Riedl 2013 for a recent overview of 
the literature). In contrast to these studies on VCMs, there are very few studies of 
heterogeneity in trust games, partly due to the predominant restriction to two players. An 
exception is Anderson et al. (2006) who show that heterogeneity in show-up fees does not 
affect choices.2 All in all, no clear picture has yet emerged about the effects of various types 
of heterogeneity on behavior in social dilemmas.3 
Our results show that players with authority try to ‘lead’ their groups towards more 
efficient outcomes; in the absence of ostracism, they are even more cooperative than are 
those without power. With ostracism, they are initially as cooperative as are the powerless. 
However, when ostracism is available, players with authority are often excluded, and very 
early in the game. This suggests that, though authority has the potential to raise efficiency, 
those without power resent it and do not allow the realization of this potential. In contrast, 
centrality is often used as a license to act uncooperatively. Though the possibility of 
ostracism does increase cooperation levels, central players free ride more than others even 
though they can be ostracized. The others tolerate such behavior; despite their lower 
cooperativeness, central players are not ostracized more often.  
Our results for authority put the previous experimental literature in a new perspective. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Also related to our authority treatments are the 3-person trust games studied by Cassar & Rigdon (2011) and 
Buskens et al. (2010). An important difference with these two studies is that in their setup the two ‘senders’ play 
separate trust games with one ‘receiver’ whereas in our study all ‘senders’ play a joint game in the sense that all 
contributions are added up and the receiver cannot return distinct amounts across the senders. 
3 There are several experimental studies that investigate public good provision in a network. The network 
determines which contributions can be accessed (Rosenkranz and Weitzel 2013; Charness et al. 2014) who can 
monitor whom (Eckel et al. 2010; Fatas et al. 2010), who can punish whom (Leibbrandt et al. 2014) or a 
combination of these (Carpenter et al. 2012). However, none of these studies involves power heterogeneity. 
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Far from leading to corrupt behavior, this form of power, often referred to as ‘leadership’, has 
been shown to have the potential to raise cooperation in groups (see, for instance, van der 
Heijden et al. 2009 and Stoddard et al. 2014). However, previous work has not considered 
how those without power react to the presence of such ‘leaders’ in their groups, other than in 
the own cooperation decisions. While leaders may act cooperatively, it cannot be taken for 
granted that others expect them to do so. If anything, the truism alluded to at the beginning of 
the paper suggests the opposite. Our results show that others jump on the opportunity to 
ostracize such leaders. This also adds to our understanding of the role of ostracism in social 
dilemmas, which has previously been shown to raise cooperation in groups (Cinyabuguma et 
al. 2005). We show that this may no longer hold under power asymmetry.  
Closest to our study is a recent paper by Cox et al. (2013) who also study social 
dilemmas with power asymmetries. In particular, their treatment where one player (a “King”) 
moves last and can decide to either take from or contribute to a common fund relates to our 
treatments where the central player has authority over the generated surplus. They find that 
the presence of such a King leads to significantly lower contributions by the other players 
compared to the baseline VCM without power asymmetries. However, Cox et al. (2013) does 
not involve a network structure and as a consequence, there is no power from centrality. 
Further, they do not allow for ostracism or other mechanisms that allow others to react to 
power. In contrast, a comparison between types of power and the reactions of the powerless 
are at the core of the research we present here. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first 
to study the effects of power derived from authority and network centrality in social 
dilemmas.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our 
experimental design and section 3 presents our testable hypotheses. Section 4 presents our 
results and section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Experimental Design and Procedures 
Subjects interact in fixed groups of five participants, with whom they play five repetitions of 
a game explained below. Each session consists of five blocks of such five-round games, with 
new groups in each five-round game. We employ a 2 × 2 × 2 between-subject design, where 
we vary (i) whether or not the stage game they play induces power from authority; (ii) 
whether or not the network structure induces power from centrality; (iii) the availability of 
ostracism as a mechanism to enhance cooperation. Power from centrality, however, can only 
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exist if ostracism is possible; if a central player cannot be removed from the network, she will  
always connect the others. The treatment combinations no-authority/centrality/no-ostracism 
and authority/centrality/no-ostracism therefore do not exist. This leaves six treatments cells, 
which are summarized in Table 1 and discussed in more detail below. Table 1 also defines 
the acronyms that we will use and shows the number of observations we have for each 
treatment.  
In all treatments, subjects play on one of two networks consisting of five players 
labeled ‘Center’ (C), ‘North’ (N), ‘East’ (E), ‘South’ (S) and ‘West’ (W) (see Figures 1a and 
1d). We will refer to the last four players as ‘periphery players’. Subjects play the game with 
all their neighbors in the network. The neighbors of a player are all the players with whom 
she is either directly or indirectly connected (a connection is indicated by a line in Figure 1). 
 In each round, players participate in a social dilemma game. Decisions and earnings 
are denoted in points. Each player 𝑖 receives an endowment of 50 points at the beginning of 
each round. All players decide simultaneously how much of the endowment, 𝑥! ∈ [0,50], 
they want to invest in a common fund. The returns that player 𝑖 receives from the common 
fund are denoted by 𝐶!. This gives the following payoff for player 𝑖 in each period: 
  𝛱! = 50− 𝑥! + 𝐶! . 
Authority 
In all No Authority treatments (nAnO, nAnC and nAC) the returns from the common fund are 
given by a standard VCM mechanism, with an MPCR of 0.6. This gives:  
  𝐶! = (0.6)(𝑥! + 𝑥!!∈!! ), 
Table 1: Summary of treatments 
  No Authority Authority 
No Ostracism (⇒  no Centrality) 
nAnO 
VCM-no voting 
N = 85 (n = 6) 
AnO 
Trust-no voting 
N = 85 (n = 6) 
Ostracism 
No Centrality 
nAnC 
VCM-voting 
N = 75 (n = 6) 
AnC 
Trust-voting 
N = 65 (n = 6) 
Centrality 
nAC 
VCM-voting 
N = 90 (n = 6) 
AC 
Trust-voting 
N = 75 (n = 6) 
Notes. The first row in each cell gives the treatment acronym. The second indicates the stage game played (a 
VCM or a multi-person trust game) and whether or not there was a voting stage to exclude players. The last 
row gives the number of subjects (N) and independent matching groups (n). Each subject played the five-
round stage game five times, with new groups formed from a 10- or 15-person matching group.	  
	   6 
 
where 𝑁!  denotes the set of neighbors of 𝑖 . Subjects decide simultaneously and the 
contributions of all players in the group are publicly announced at the end of each round.  
 In the Authority treatments (AnO, AnC and AC) we depart from the standard setting 
by allowing the center player to decide how to allocate the returns from the common fund. 
This player receives all contributions to the common fund from the periphery players. These 
contributions, and her own are multiplied by a factor 𝛼 = 0.6 ∙ ( 𝑁! + 1), i.e. if no player is 
excluded the contributions are multiplied by a factor 𝛼 = 3. The value of the common fund is 
then 𝐹 = 𝛼  (𝑥! + 𝑥!!∈!! ). 4 The center player determines the division of the common fund 
within the group. In particular, she decides how much, R, of the common fund, to return to 
the periphery players, which is then divided equally among them. Thus the returns from the 
common fund are 𝐶! = 𝐹 − 𝑅 for the center and 𝐶! = 𝑅 |𝑁!| for each periphery player. 
Note that the center player cannot discriminate among periphery players. Subjects thus play a 
trust game with four senders (the periphery players) and one receiver (the center player, who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The specification of 𝛼 ensures that the maximal sum of payoffs is the same in all treatments. Note that the 
VCM without authority is captured by this specification: the group account is split equally and each player 
receives !!! !! 𝑥!! , which is 0.6 𝑥!!  for full networks, i.e., the MPCR is 0.6. 
Figure 1: Network Structures
 
    a: No player excluded              b: Periphery player excluded  c: Center player excluded 
 
    d: No player excluded            e: Periphery player excluded   f: Center player excluded 
 
Notes. The top panel shows the network structure for the cases without power from centrality and the lower 
panel when there is centrality. The three cases per panel distinguish between the network comprising of all 
players, the network without N and the network without C. 	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can also ‘send’). Each period consists of two decisions. First, all players decide 
simultaneously on their contribution 𝑥! and all contributions are made public information. 
Second, the center player decides on 𝑅, and payoffs are realized and made public.  
 
Centrality  
To create power from centrality in this framework (nAC and AC), we allow players to be 
excluded from further participation in the network, in a manner explained below. If a player 
is excluded from the network, the non-excluded players can only continue with players with 
whom they remain connected. In the complete networks of the type shown in the top panel of 
Figure 1, those not excluded remain connected in groups of four, irrespective of whether a 
periphery player (1b) or the center player (1c) has been excluded.  
This is different in the centrality case depicted in the lower panel. Power from 
centrality occurs because one player (C) is necessary to keep others connected to each other. 
The general idea is that there are two pairs of periphery players (N&W and S&E) that are 
connected only via the center player C. In a network like 1d, the consequences of removing a 
player depend crucially on her position. Consider first the situation illustrated in Figure 1e, 
where player N has been excluded. All of her connections have been removed. Here, the 
remaining four players remain connected. Figure 1f illustrates the case when the center has 
been excluded. This creates two separate groups of two players each (N&W and S&E), as all 
of C’s connections have been removed. This is the way in which power from centrality is 
operationalized in our design. The center player has more of this power than the periphery 
players. When C is excluded, the periphery players not only lose her future contributions (this 
also occurs when a periphery player is excluded), but also of two other periphery players. 
This makes it more costly to exclude the center player in our centrality treatments. 
 
Ostracism  
Our third treatment variable concerns the possibility for players to exclude others from 
further interaction with the group, i.e., to create the networks in Figures 1b or 1c (1e or 1f) 
from the five-player networks in 1a (1d). When there is no ostracism, all five players 
participate in each of the five repetitions of the stage game. With ostracism, each of the first 
	   8 
four rounds ends with a voting stage that can lead to one or more players being banned from 
the group.5 As explained above, ostracism allows us to create power from centrality.  
After having observed others’ decisions in the social dilemma played in the current 
round, each player in a group may cast votes to exclude any number of players she is still 
linked with. She may cast at most one vote for each player.6 If a player receives half or more 
of the possible number of votes, she is excluded until the end of the five rounds and can no 
longer participate in the remaining rounds. Hence, in a group of five, a player is excluded if 
she receives three or more votes, and in a group of four two votes suffice to be excluded. 
Voting is costless and anonymous in the sense that only the number of votes cast by each 
subject is announced but not at whom the votes were directed. Moreover, it is announced 
which players have been excluded (if any). 
Excluded players receive a fixed sum equal to the endowment in the stage games for 
each of the remaining rounds, but can no longer interact with the group in any way. Hence an 
excluded player can no longer contribute nor will she receive any benefits from the common 
fund. Also, excluded players are not allowed to vote for exclusion. In case a player has been 
excluded, non-excluded players can only vote to exclude one or more of their remaining 
neighbors. For the remaining players, the consequences of a player being excluded depend 
both on the treatment and on the player concerned. In networks without centrality or authority 
the remaining players play the (four-person) VCM.7 With authority, but without centrality, 
the remaining players play a (four-person) trust game if a periphery player has been excluded 
and a four-person VCM if the central player has been excluded. When there is power from 
centrality but not authority, players play a four-player VCM after exclusion of a periphery 
player (Figure 1e) and two-player VCMs if the central player has been excluded (Figure 1f). 
Finally, with centrality and authority, exclusion of a periphery player (1e) yields a four-
person trust game and exclusion of the central player (1f) gives two-player VCM games. 	  
 
Procedures 
The computerized experiment was run in the CREED laboratory of the University of 
Amsterdam. In total 475 student subjects from a variety of academic disciplines participated, 
each in one session. For each treatment, we ran 3 sessions, each with 20, 25 or 30 subjects. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 There is no voting stage in the final period. Note that the fact that more than one player can be excluded means 
that the networks in Figure 1 do not cover all possible cases. Other cases are straightforward. 
6 We allow players the option to vote to exclude themselves as well. This was observed in only 16 out of 6,100 
instances of voting.  
7 We discuss here the situation after the first exclusion. The cases for subsequent exclusions follow straightfor-
wardly. 
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Upon entering the laboratory, communication between subjects was restricted and subjects 
were randomly assigned separate cubicles. Subjects received on-screen instructions, which 
they could read at their own pace. After reading the instructions, all participants were 
requested to answer several test questions.8 The experiment started only after all subjects had 
answered the test questions correctly. Each session lasted approximately one hour. 
Within a session, subjects played five blocks of one of the five-round games 
described above. To reduce noise and avoid behavioral spill-overs, subjects’ roles were kept 
fixed throughout a session; a subject was randomly assigned either the center or a periphery 
role at the beginning of a session. In all treatments, subjects’ contributions in a round were 
identified by their position in the network, i.e., North, South, etc. However, to minimize the 
possibility of long-term reputation formation and thus revenge motives, subjects were 
randomly re-matched into different groups after each block of five rounds. For this re-
matching, we used two matching groups with either 10 or 15 subjects each, depending on the 
number of participants in the session. After the experiment, subjects were requested to fill out 
a short questionnaire.  
At the end of each session, one block was randomly selected and subjects were paid 
their earnings from all rounds within this block. Earnings in points were converted to cash 
using an exchange rate of 60 points to one euro. Subject earned between 10.60 and 30.70 
euro, with an average of 15.90 euro, including a show-up fee of 7 euro. 
 
3 Hypotheses   
We make the ‘standard’ assumption that players’ preferences are fixed; in this case this 
means that preferences are not affected by having power. The stage-game equilibria of the 
social dilemma games are then straightforward for the case where individuals are self-
interested. In the VCM, nobody will contribute to the common fund. In the trust game, the 
only player that will contribute to the common fund is C, who (as long as she is connected to 
some other player) will contribute her entire endowment and keep all the proceeds for herself. 
As a consequence, power is not predicted to have any effect; the only treatment effect 
predicted in the self-interested case is that a player with authority will contribute more to the 
common fund than players without, though she will not share it. This case of self-interested 
preferences serves as a benchmark yielding the null hypotheses for our statistical tests.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 8 Summaries of the experimental instructions are provided in Appendix A. Full instructions and the test 
questions are available in an online appendix (www.borisvanleeuwen.nl/ACinstructionsfull.pdf).  
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In the experiment, we implement a (finitely) repeated game and we add ostracism in 
some treatments. If players are assumed to be self-interested and believe that all others are 
too, there are no repeated game equilibria with positive contributions in the VCM games.9 
This is different in the Authority treatments with ostracism. Here, the threat of exclusion does 
affect players with authority as the stage-game Nash payoff is strictly higher than the 
exclusion payoff for players with authority. This opens the door for repeated game equilibria 
where the center player shares some of her surplus and where periphery players make 
positive contributions. In any case, repeated play of the stage-game equilibrium is still an 
equilibrium of the repeated game.  
If we assume that (some) players have social preferences or if (some) players believe 
that some fraction of the population is willing to ostracize free riders, cooperative repeated 
game equilibria may exist in all treatments. Moreover, in this case, treatment effects may be 
predicted in equilibrium. However, this leads to a plethora of equilibria, depending on the 
specific assumptions. Instead of deriving all equilibria and searching for refinements, we will 
employ a simple setting with cooperative types (similar to Kreps et al. 1982) to derive 
comparative statics for the effects of ostracism, centrality and authority.  
 Before doing so, we define what we mean by ‘cooperation’ in our settings. To 
measure cooperation at the individual level, we consider how a player’s choice affects the 
payoffs of others. For a periphery player and for a central player without authority, this 
simply means that the measure should be perfectly (linearly) correlated with the contribution 
to the common fund. For a player with authority, cooperation entails more than just 
contributing to the common fund. Since she will contribute her complete endowment even if 
selfish, she will create more surplus than the periphery players whenever the latter contribute 
less than their endowments. In addition, a cooperative type must also distribute the surplus 
raised in a ‘cooperative’ manner. 
We denote ‘individual cooperativeness’ by 𝛾! defined as: 
(1)  𝛾!   ≡   𝜌𝑖𝑥𝑖/50 , i = C, P  
where 𝑥!  denotes i’s contribution level. For players without authority, we adopt the 
convention that 𝜌! = 1 . For a player with authority, we define a fully cooperative 
distribution, 𝑅!"#$%, as one that divides the surplus generated by the group equally among all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In some settings, costless voting could lead to repeated game equilibria with positive contributions (Hirshleifer 
& Rasmusen, 1989). However, in our study, excluded players still earn their endowment (which equals the Nash 
stage-game payoff). For this reason, there exists no subgame perfect equilibrium with positive contributions if 
all agents are payoff-maximizers. More information is available upon request. 
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players. Our benchmark for cooperative behavior is thus the VCM where this happens by 
default. Part of our measure of cooperation for players with authority, then, is the fraction of 
this fully cooperative distribution they implement. To quantify, we define:  
   𝜌! ≡ 𝑅/𝑅!"#$%.  
Note from (1) that – like any player – a player with authority acts uncooperatively if she 
contributes less than 100% of her endowment (which in her case also does not serve her self-
interest).10 She also acts uncooperatively if she returns an ‘uncooperative’ amount. In our 
experiments, almost all subjects with authority contributed their entire endowment. Their 
level of cooperation is then determined almost exclusively by 𝜌! , the extent to which they 
share the gains from cooperation with the periphery.  
 We now turn to a formulation of our alternative hypotheses. As mentioned above we 
consider a simple setting where players are either self-interested or of a ‘cooperative type’. 
We assume that all players act rationally, conditional on their preferences. Cooperative types 
unconditionally play in a way that achieves 𝛾 = 1 in all periods.11 If there is the possibility of 
exclusion, they will vote to exclude any player that does not act as a cooperative type in this 
way (i.e., any player j with 𝛾! < 1). Let 𝑝!" be the prior probability that player 𝑖 assigns to 𝑗 
being a cooperative type and 1− 𝑝!" the prior probability that that player 𝑖 assigns to 𝑗 being 
self-interested. Given that interactions are anonymous and positions are randomly allocated, 
we will simply assume 𝑝!" = 𝑝,∀  𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑖   ≠ 𝑗. Note that the model nests the standard case 
where all players are rational and self interested by setting 𝑝 = 0. 
For each of the treatment variables, we will use this setup to derive alternative 
hypotheses. We do so by examining whether players would prefer to (i) exclude others who 
were observed to free-ride (𝛾 = 0) or cooperate (𝛾 = 1) in the penultimate cooperation stage, 
and using this, whether (ii) self-interested players will mimic cooperative types in the 
penultimate cooperation stage. This allows us to derive the relevant comparative statics. We 
base the direction of the comparative statics on the level of 𝑝 that is needed to sustain 
cooperation; we expect higher levels of cooperation in situations where a lower 𝑝 is required 
to sustain cooperation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 An exception is the case where she returns more than Requal. This yields 𝜌!>1 and the possibility that 𝛾!  >1 
even if she does not contribute her complete endowment. This scenario where 𝜌!>1 was only observed in 4% of 
the cases. 
11 The assumption of unconditional cooperation for this type is, admittedly, limiting. But, we see our approach 
as applying a ‘toy model’ aimed at deriving plausible comparative static predictions.  
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In all treatments, in the final round, self-interested players will simply play according 
to the stage-game Nash equilibrium: players without authority will not contribute anything 
and players with authority will contribute their complete endowment and keep the entire 
group account. In both cases 𝛾 = 0.  
Before considering the effects of power, we consider groups where no one has power 
(nAnO and nAnC). Without the possibility of ostracism, self-interested players will not 
cooperate in the penultimate round, as there is no mechanism through which cooperative 
behavior can be enforced. This is independent of the proportion of cooperative types 𝑝. This 
changes with ostracism. Consider a strategy profile where players that do not fully cooperate, 
i.e., players with 𝛾 < 1, are excluded and others are not. A self-interested player is willing to 
sustain such a strategy profile as any player with 𝛾 < 1 cannot be a cooperative type and will 
thus be uncooperative (𝛾 = 0) in the final period. Excluding such a player will not affect 𝑖’s 
payoffs. On the other hand, excluding a player who acted cooperatively (𝛾 = 1) is costly in 
expectation if 𝑝 > 0. Similarly, being excluded from the final period is costly when 𝑝 > 0. 
For complete groups, payoffs for a self-interested player are 50+ 0.6 4 ∙ 50𝑝 = 50+ 120𝑝 
if she has not been excluded and simply 50 if she has been excluded. Given that all other 
players are either a cooperative type or mimicking a cooperative type, for a self-interested 
player, mimicking a cooperative type in the penultimate round is a best response if: 
  0.6 5 ∙ 50 + 50+ 120𝑝 > 50+ 0.6 4 ∙ 50 + 50, 
i.e. when 𝑝 > !! . Hence, a small proportion of cooperative types suffices to sustain 
cooperation under the threat of exclusion. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (positive effect of ostracism):  
 𝛾!  and 𝛾! are both higher in nAnC than in nAnO. 
 
This is in line with previous evidence that the ability to exclude players from the group raises 
cooperation (Cinyabuguma et al., 2005). As there are no power asymmetries in nAnO and 
nAnC, we expect that both roles (center and periphery players) will be equally 
(un)cooperative.  
Now consider the effects of introducing authority. In the absence of ostracism (AnO) 
cooperation cannot be sustained in equilibrium, regardless of the value of 𝑝. Hence, we 
expect that the introduction of authority will not affect cooperativeness in the absence of 
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ostracism. This changes with ostracism. First, consider the center player. Excluding an 
uncooperative center player does not come at a cost, but will in fact lead to higher payoffs in 
the final period when 𝑝 > 0. This is because a self-interested center player will keep all the 
proceeds of the common fund to herself. If the center player acts uncooperatively in the 
penultimate period, then this reveals that she is self-interested. Excluding the center will then 
be beneficial, because by doing so, a 4-player VCM will be played in the final period and one 
might benefit from the presence of cooperative types amongst the other periphery players. If 
the center player acts cooperatively in the penultimate period, she could be a cooperative type 
or self-interested. Periphery players may wish to exclude her, again yielding a 4-player VCM 
in the final period. The expected payoffs for a self-interested player in this 4-player game are 50+ 0.6 3 ∙ 50𝑝 = 50+ 90𝑝 . Leaving the center in the group means that the self-
interested player will only benefit from (others’) contributions to the group fund if the center 
player is cooperative (which occurs with probability 𝑝). This gives an expected payoff in the 
final period of 50+ 𝑝 0.6 50+ 3 ∙ 50𝑝 = 50+ 30𝑝 + 90𝑝! . Hence, self-interested 
periphery players will prefer to exclude a center player with authority who cooperated in the 
penultimate period when 𝑝 < !! (which we assume from here onwards). Anticipating that she 
will be excluded anyway, a self-interested center player will be uncooperative in the 
penultimate period. Hence, in the presence of ostracism, authority will have a negative effect 
on the average cooperativeness of center players.  
Now consider the periphery players. Excluding an uncooperative periphery player 
does not come at a cost, while excluding a cooperative periphery player is costly if 𝑝 > 0. 
Hence, uncooperative periphery players may be excluded in equilibrium but cooperative 
periphery players may not. Given that a self-interested center will be uncooperative in the 
penultimate round (and that the center will be excluded in any case), a periphery player will 
mimic a cooperative type when: 
  𝑝 0.6 5 ∙ 50 + 50+ 90𝑝 > 50+ 𝑝 0.6 4 ∙ 50 + 50, 
which holds for 𝑝 > !!". Recall that without authority, mimicking the cooperative type is a 
best response for 𝑝 > !!. Hence, under the threat of exclusion periphery players require a 
greater proportion of cooperative types in order to sustain cooperation when authority is 
introduced. 
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Hypothesis 2 (effects of authority):  
(a) In the absence of ostracism, authority does not affect cooperativeness, i.e. 𝛾!  and 𝛾! are the same in AnO and nAnO. 
(b) In the presence of ostracism, authority lowers cooperativeness of both center and 
periphery players, i.e. 𝛾!  and 𝛾! are lower in AnC than in nAnC, but center players 
are more likely to be affected, i.e. 𝛾! <   𝛾! in AnC. 
 
We now move to the effects of centrality on cooperativeness within groups. Recall that 
ostracism is a necessary condition for center players to derive power from centrality. Thus, 
we compare power from centrality to the situation where groups can ostracize members but 
there is no power from centrality (nAnC). Excluding an uncooperative player without 
centrality (any player in nAnC or a periphery player in nAC) will not affect expected payoffs 
in the final round. Excluding an uncooperative central player comes at a cost though: one can 
no longer benefit from the contributions by cooperative types who were connected via C. 
Hence, self-interested periphery players will not be willing to exclude an uncooperative 
player with centrality for any 𝑝 > 0. This reduces the chances that a central player acting 
uncooperatively will be excluded, allowing her to ‘abuse’ her power. Note that centrality 
does not change the effect a threat of exclusion has on periphery players. 
 
Hypothesis 3 (effects of centrality):  
(a) 𝛾! <   𝛾! in nAC.  
(b) 𝛾! is lower in nAC than in nAnC. 
 
Finally, we consider the situation when a player derives power from two sources, i.e., from 
both authority and centrality (AC). Since ostracism is necessary for centrality, we focus on 
situations that allow ostracism. As described above, with only one source of power we expect 
powerful players to take advantage of their position, both for power from authority and power 
from centrality. In AnC, periphery players may even exclude center players when they act 
cooperatively. This is because they have an attractive alternative: a 4-player VCM. In AC, 
this alternative is a 2-player VCM, which is less attractive than the 4-player version. In AC, 
periphery players will only exclude a center player acting cooperatively in the penultimate 
round when  
  50+ 0.6 1 ∙ 50𝑝 >   50+ 𝑝 0.6 50+ 3 ∙ 50𝑝 , 
	   15 
which never holds in the presence of cooperative types (𝑝 > 0). Excluding an uncooperative 
center does lead to higher expected payoffs for periphery players (if 𝑝 > 0). Now, a self-
interested center player will mimic a cooperative type if: 
  0.6(5 ∙ 50)+ 3 50+ 4 ∙ 50𝑝 > 3(5 ∙ 50)+ 50, 
which holds if 𝑝 > !!. This is the same constraint as in AnC. Hence, we do not expect that the 
cooperativeness of center players is affected by the addition of centrality to authority. The 
other way around, we expect that adding authority to centrality has a positive effect on the 
cooperativeness of center players. This is because (as argued above) uncooperative center 
players face no threat of exclusion when there is no authority. When adding authority, the 
threat of being ostracized provides a reason to be more cooperative. 
 
Hypothesis 4 (effects of authority and centrality):  
(a) 𝛾! is larger in AC than in nAC. 
(b) 𝛾! is not different in AC and in AnC. 
 
The key to increased cooperation is thus punishment (here, votes to ostracize) specifically 
targeted at those with low cooperation levels.12 In our ostracism treatments, we expect lower 
cooperativeness to be associated with higher rates of ostracism. In addition, we explore 
whether the distinct roles (center or periphery) are targeted for ostracism with different 
intensities. If there is no discrimination by voters between roles, targeting would imply 
(negative) correlations between cooperation and exclusion rates that are similar across 
network positions. Conditional on cooperativeness, if players in a particular role face a higher 
(lower) ostracism rate, we say that the role faces negative (positive) discrimination. We 
hypothesized above that players with power from centrality will abuse their power. In light of 
the high cost of ostracizing such players, we expect that they will face positive 
discrimination. In contrast, center players in AnC are expected to be ostracized even when 
they are cooperative.  
 
Hypothesis 5 (exclusion):  
(a) Players with higher cooperativeness receive fewer votes for exclusion.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Such threats of retaliation have been seen to work in other disciplining mechanisms as well. For instance, see 
Fehr and Gächter (2000) and Sefton et al. (2007) on peer punishment in public goods games.  
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(b) Conditional on cooperativeness, center players face positive discrimination when 
they have power from centrality, i.e., they receive fewer votes for exclusion than 
periphery players with similar levels of cooperativeness.  
(c) Conditional on cooperativeness, center players face negative discrimination when 
they have power from authority, i.e., they receive more votes for exclusion than 
periphery players with similar levels of cooperativeness. 
 
These hypotheses will be tested against a null of no effect of cooperation on votes to exclude 
and no discrimination, respectively. 
The above hypotheses focus on the individual and take into account the impact of a 
player’s choices on the distribution of surplus, especially in the trust game. To examine the 
impact of power on group-level performance, we construct a measure of cooperation at the 
group level, which we call the ‘net efficiency gain’, 𝜙!: 
(2)  𝜙! ≡    !"#$%&"'  !"#$%"!!  !"#!  !"#$%"!!"#!!"#!  !"#$%"! ,  
where ‘Nash surplus’ is the surplus in the Nash equilibrium for self-interested players and 
750 is the maximum aggregate surplus in a round. Note that for the VCM, 𝜙!correlates 
perfectly with aggregate contributions. For the Trust game, it corrects for the fact that even 
self-interested players with authority contribute in the Nash equilibrium. Finally (2) only 
measures the gain in efficiency and says nothing about how the surplus is distributed (which 
is especially relevant for the Trust game). As with individual cooperation, we expect that 
ostracism will raise group-level efficiency. Excluding players (especially those with 
authority) will lower efficiency, however. Based on hypothesis 2, we then expect, ceteris 
paribus, authority to reduce efficiency in the presence of ostracism. Similarly, based on 
hypothesis 3, we expect centrality to reduce efficiency.  
 
Hypothesis 6 (efficiency):  
(a) 𝜙!is higher when ostracism is available; i.e. higher in nAnC than in nAnO and 
higher in AnC than in AnO. 
(b) In the presence of ostracism, the addition of power from authority decreases 𝜙!; 
i.e., 𝜙!is lower in AnC than in nAnC. 
(c) The addition of power from centrality decreases 𝜙!; i.e., 𝜙! is lower in nAC than 
in nAnC. 
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We will test hypotheses 1-6 in the next section. 
 
4 Results 
We start with a general overview of our results. This is followed by separate discussions of 
the effects of the two power types, starting with the absence of power and finishing with the 
combination of the two types. We then provide discussions of voting (to ostracize) behavior 
and our efficiency results. First, Figure 2 presents the mean cooperativeness (𝛾) in our 
various treatments.13 For this overview we combine data from all blocks.14 The figure shows 
that cooperation is higher with ostracism than without and that differences in cooperation 
between the center and the periphery occur only when there is power of either type (but not 
when both types of power appear together). We will investigate the differences across 
treatments in more detail in the following subsections and test the hypotheses derived above. 
Unless stated otherwise, all reported statistics come from two-sided tests using matching 
groups as the unit of analysis, and averages over all rounds and blocks.15 The number of 
observations is thus six in each comparison sample. 
 
 4.1  No Power - The effects of ostracism 
Figure 2 shows the usual pattern of declining cooperation over time in the standard public 
goods game (nAnO) in the absence of any power and ostracism (see, for instance, Fehr and 
Gächter, 2000). In the absence of power, the only difference between player positions is one 
of framing, where the center player is presented as being in the ‘middle’ of the group. As 
predicted, this has no effect; there is no difference in cooperativeness between the center and 
periphery players. A Wilcoxon signed ranks test (henceforth, W) shows no significant 
difference in γ between the center and periphery players in nAnO (W, p = 0.463).   
Once we allow for ostracism (nAnC), we observe that cooperation increases for both 
center and periphery players. This pattern replicates findings in Cinyabuguma et al. (2005), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 For completeness, the corresponding figure for contribution levels (as opposed to 𝛾) is presented in Appendix 
B. As expected, players with authority contribute almost 100% of their endowments in all rounds. Appendix B 
also presents the return rates 𝜌 for players with authority power and a table with the mean cooperation rates by 
treatment and position. 
14 We do not observe any differences in cooperation between blocks, except in nAnO, where we observe a 
downward trend over blocks.  
15 When we exclude the last round of each block, all results remain qualitatively the same 
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an early work documenting the finding that ostracism raises cooperativeness in groups.16 As 
expected, there are again no differences between the roles (W, p = 0.463). Mann-Whitney 
tests (MW) confirm that cooperativeness increases with ostracism for both center (MW, p = 
0.078) and periphery (MW, p = 0.016) players. As a consequence, average cooperativeness in 
the group as a whole is higher (MW, p = 0.010). This gives our first result summarized 
below. 
 
Result 1 (effects of ostracism): In the absence of power, the opportunity to ostracize group 
members raises the cooperativeness of both center and periphery players.  
 
This supports hypothesis 1. 
 
4.2  The effects of power from authority 
The three panels on the right half of Figure 2 show, first, that in the absence of ostracism 
(AnO) the cooperativeness of periphery players is reduced relative to when no one has power 
(MW, p = 0.055) while that of center players remains unaffected (MW, p = 0.150). Taken 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Note the end effect exists even with ostracism; there is a sharp drop in cooperativeness in round 5. This can be 
attributed to the fact that there are no opportunities to ostracize group members in the final round. 
Figure 2. Mean cooperativeness (𝜸) by player position 
 
Notes. The three panels on the left denote the treatments without authority and the three panels on the right 
show the cases with authority. The horizontal axis shows the five rounds. For each round, cooperativeness is 
averaged across five blocks. The graphs are based on decisions by individuals who have not been excluded 
from their group and who are not isolated. 	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together, average cooperativeness in the group is lower as well (MW, p = 0.037). As before, 
we observe a steady decline over time. Further, authority drives a wedge between the 
cooperation levels of the center and periphery players – center players are significantly more 
cooperative than are periphery players (W, p = 0.028).17  
When ostracism is allowed in the presence of authority (AnC), cooperativeness 
increases unambiguously for periphery players compared to the case of no ostracism (MW, p 
= 0.004). While cooperativeness initially increases for center players, the overall effect across 
five rounds is not significant (MW, p = 1.000).18 Overall, ostracism does raise average 
cooperativeness in the group as a whole (MW, p = 0.016). Hence, the threat of exclusion 
promotes cooperation in the presence of authority as well. However, across all rounds center 
players are less cooperative than periphery players (W, p = 0.046). A comparison of the left 
and right panels of Figure 2 shows that, when ostracism is available, the addition of authority 
(nAnC vs. AnC) does not affect the cooperativeness of periphery players while that of 
powerful players is reduced (MW, p = 0.078 for center, p = 0.749 for periphery). The latter 
effect seems to be due mostly to lower cooperativeness of players with authority in later 
rounds. 
 
Result 2 (effects of authority):  
(a) In the absence of ostracism, authority does not affect the cooperativeness of center 
players. However, it decreases that of periphery players. Players with authority are 
more cooperative than those without power.  
(b) In the presence of ostracism, authority lowers the cooperativeness of center 
players. The cooperativeness of periphery players is unaffected. Players with 
authority are less cooperative than those without. 
 
Result 2(a) contradicts hypothesis 2(a), which predicts no effect of cooperativeness with 
authority in the absence of ostracism. Result 2(b) partly supports hypothesis 2(b), which 
predicts that cooperativeness decreases for both roles. All in all, we find mixed support for 
hypothesis 2. We will discuss possible reasons in the general discussion of our results in 
section 5. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The periphery’s reaction (reduced cooperation) is reminiscent of the Falk and Kosfeld (2006) finding that 
subjects dislike being controlled. 
18 Results on the cooperativeness of players with authority in the presence of ostracism may be affected by the 
fact that there are few left in the group after the first round. We document this later when we discuss ostracism 
patterns. 
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4.3  The effects of power from centrality 
Figure 2 shows that, in the presence of centrality alone (nAC), there is a difference between 
cooperation levels of the center and periphery players. Center players seem to ‘abuse’ their 
power; center players are 7.7 percentage points less cooperative than periphery players and 
this is statistically significant (W, p = 0.028). Compared to a situation in which no player has 
any power (nAnC), Figure 2 suggests that the cooperativeness of players with power from 
centrality is not very different while that of periphery players is higher. Tests, however, show 
that cooperativeness is not significantly different for center (MW, p = 0.873) or for periphery 
(MW, p = 0.262) players.19 Hence, though the partial effects in either player type are not 
significant, the effects of introducing power through centrality are large enough to make the 
difference between the types statistically significant.20 
 
Result 3 (effects of centrality):  
(a) Players who derive power from centrality are less cooperative than players with 
no power.  
(b) Cooperation levels of both center and periphery players are not affected by power 
from centrality.  
 
Result 3(a) supports hypothesis 3(a). Result 3(b) implies that, for the center player, this does 
not allow us to reject the null in favor of the alternative in hypothesis 3(b).  
 
4.4  The effects of power from authority and centrality 
For environments with ostracism, we compare cooperativeness in AC with situations where 
there is only one source of power. When the powerful player is only central (nAC), Figure 2 
suggests that central players are as cooperative as in AC while periphery players are more 
cooperative than in AC. This is confirmed by statistical tests (MW, p = 0.423 for center and p 
= 0.078 for periphery players). On the other hand, when the powerful player has only 
authority (AnC), Figure 2 suggests that central players are less cooperative than in AC while 
periphery players are as cooperative as in AC. However, tests show no significant differences 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Compared to a situation of no power and no ostracism (nAnO), cooperation levels are higher for both center 
(MW, p = 0.025) and periphery (MW, p = 0.004) players. This reiterates Result 1 and the finding in 
Cinyabuguma et al. (2005) that the ability to ostracize group members successfully raises cooperation in groups.  
20 The differences in cooperativeness between periphery and center players are also significantly larger in nAC 
than in nAnC (MW, p = 0.016). 
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(MW, p = 0.150 for center and p = 1.000 for periphery players). Finally, Figure 2 shows no 
discernible difference in cooperativeness between center and periphery players in AC. This 
observation seems statistically supported (W, p = 0.753). Thus, we do not find that powerful 
players take advantage of their power when power is derived from both sources. 
 
Result 4 (effects of authority and centrality):  
(a) Adding authority to centrality does not change the cooperativeness of already 
powerful players. However, it decreases the cooperativeness of players without 
power.  
(b) Adding centrality to authority does not change the cooperativeness of either 
powerful players or periphery players. 
 
Result 4(a) contradicts hypothesis 4(a), which predicts a positive effect for the center player. 
Results 4(b) supports hypothesis 4(b). 
Our setup also allows us to directly compare the two types of power. Compared to 
when powerful players have only authority (AnC), the cooperativeness of both center and 
periphery players appear somewhat higher when powerful players are only central (nAC). 
However, the difference is only (weakly) significant for center players (MW, p = 0.078) and 
not significant for periphery players (MW, p = 0.109).  
 
4.5  Voting behavior and ostracism 
Figure 3 presents the cumulative proportion of center and periphery players excluded over 
rounds in each of our four ostracism treatments. To facilitate seeing the correlation between 
cooperativeness and ostracism, the figure also shows cooperativeness. Observe first that 
when no one has any power (nAnC) ostracism rates rise with time for both player roles and 
remain under 20% to the end. Further, there is no discrimination; there is no discernible 
difference in cooperativeness or in the rate of ostracism between center and periphery 
players. When powerful players are central (nAC), they are less cooperative than are 
periphery players. While the ostracism rate rises over time for both roles, it appears that 
central players face positive discrimination; though their cooperation level is lower, central 
players are not more likely to be ostracized than are periphery players.  
When center players have only authority (AnC), the picture shows a stark difference. 
While cumulative ostracism rates do increase over time for both roles, they differ wildly 
between the roles. In the first 2-3 rounds, there is hardly any difference in cooperativeness 
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between the roles. However, powerful players are much more likely to be ostracized than are 
periphery players. At the end of round 1, slightly over 40% of center players are excluded 
while less than 10% of periphery players are excluded. This difference is only magnified over 
time; by the end of round 4, over 90% of center players have been excluded while less than 
20% of periphery players have been excluded. This difference seems too large to be 
explained by distinct levels of cooperativeness. It appears that center players with power 
from authority face severe negative discrimination from periphery players. 
When powerful players derive power from both authority and centrality (AC), there is 
no significant difference in cooperativeness between roles. Nevertheless, as in AnC, center 
players face negative discrimination. They are more likely to be ostracized than are periphery 
players. Once again, this is evident from the very beginning and magnified over time. By the 
last round about 50% of the center players have been excluded while this holds for less than 
20% of the periphery players.  
We test for the patterns noted above using individual-level regressions where we 
explain the number of votes for exclusion received by individuals (in rounds 1 - 4). For each 
treatment, we estimate a separate Poisson regression where the dependent variable is the 
number of votes for exclusion received (0–5) in a round. The independent variables include 
the individual’s cooperativeness (𝛾) in the round, a dummy for being the center player, the 
interaction between the two, the number of members in the individual’s subgroup in the 
Figure 3. Exclusion and cooperativeness by player position 
 
Notes: Cumulative exclusion rates and cooperativeness for center and periphery players. Exclusion rates 
reflect the proportion of players that are on average excluded in the respective round. Means are taken across 
all blocks.	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round, a time trend for rounds and a time trend for blocks. For each individual, we only 
include rounds in which he/she had not yet been excluded and where she was not isolated. 
The regression estimates are presented in Table 2. Since the estimated coefficients of Poisson 
regressions are not readily interpretable, we plot the estimated votes received as a function of 
cooperativeness in Figure 4. Together, Table 2 and Figure 4 allow us to understand the 
determinants of exclusion votes and their (statistical) importance, and to compare these 
results across treatments. 
 The regressions provide statistical underpinning for the patterns described above. The 
first regression – for the case where no one has any power (nAnC) – shows that those with 
higher cooperation levels receive fewer votes; the coefficient of cooperativeness is negative 
and significant at the 1% level. Also, as expected, there is no discrimination between roles. 
The number of exclusion votes received decreases across rounds in a block and increases 
across blocks. Whereas the latter effect could indicate learning, the former is likely  
attributable to the fact that exclusion has less effect as the number of rounds remaining 
decreases. These time trends mostly disappear when we add power. In contrast, the strong 
Table 2. Votes received for exclusion 
 
No Power 
(nAnC) 
Centrality 
(nAC) 
Authority 
(AnC) 
Authority and 
Centrality 
(AC) 
Cooperativeness -3.436*** -3.522*** -2.989*** -2.980*** 
 (0.161) (0.171) (0.156) (0.164) 
Center -0.247 -0.498* 0.288** 0.361** 
 (0.201) (0.297) (0.128) (0.179) 
Center × Cooperativeness  0.0987 0.797** 1.744*** 0.870*** 
(0.326) (0.386) (0.208) (0.252) 
Number of players in subgroup 0.165 0.526*** 0.288*** 0.543*** 
 (0.133) (0.149) (0.0860) (0.0751) 
Round -0.166*** 0.114** 0.0276 0.0444 
 (0.0427) (0.0447) (0.0399) (0.0403) 
Block 0.0945*** 0.0324 0.0478* 0.00941 
 (0.0322) (0.0347) (0.0281) (0.0311) 
Constant 0.515 -2.000** -0.556 -2.088*** 
 (0.720) (0.778) (0.480) (0.416) 
Observations 1442 1758 1136 1385 
Notes: Regression estimates from (mixed) random effects poisson regressions, where we allow for random 
effects at the matching group and the subject level. Dep. variable: Number of votes for exclusion received in 
the current round. Only non-excluded and non-isolated subjects are included in the regressions. Standard 
errors  clustered on matching groups in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.	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negative effect of cooperativeness on the number of votes received is observed in all power 
configurations. 
The second regression shows that players with centrality power receive fewer votes 
for exclusion, even after controlling for cooperativeness. Moreover, the interaction term is 
positive and significant. Figure 4 illustrates the net effect: for low levels of cooperativeness, 
players with centrality receive fewer votes for exclusion than periphery players. This result 
provides empirical support for the tolerated theft hypothesis referred to in the introduction. 
Note that it is not the case that center players are at an advantage irrespective of their choices. 
For relatively high levels of cooperativeness, center players receive similar number of votes 
as her periphery counterparts. The positive discrimination that we observe is completely 
attributable to tolerated theft. 
In both treatments where players have authority (third and fourth regression), center 
players receive significantly more votes than periphery players. However, the interaction 
term is positive and significant. Figure 4 shows that players with power from authority (but 
without centrality, AnC), receive more votes for exclusion than periphery players, at any level 
of cooperativeness. Even when players with authority are fully cooperative, they can expect 
to receive a positive number of votes. This negative discrimination explains the divergence in 
ostracism rates between center and periphery players in the authority treatments evident in 
Figure 3. In AC, center players derive power from both centrality and authority. In this case, 
again center players receive more votes than periphery players, but the effect is smaller than 
in AnC. This suggests that centrality mitigates the negative discrimination center players face 
Figure 4. Estimated votes received for exclusion   
 
Notes: Estimated number of votes received as function of cooperativeness for center and periphery players. 
Estimations based on the regressions reported in Table 2. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 	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and explains why the divergence between ostracism rates for the two roles is smaller in AC 
than in AnC.  
 
 Result 5:  
(a) In all ostracism treatments, there is a negative relation between votes received 
and cooperativeness.  
(b) Controlling for cooperativeness, players with power from centrality are ostracized 
less frequently than periphery players.  
(c) Controlling for cooperativeness, players with power from authority are ostracized 
more frequently than periphery players. 
 
Results 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) directly support hypotheses 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) respectively. 
 
4.6 Efficiency Comparisons 
Table 3 presents summary statistics on group level net efficiency gain (NEG) in each 
treatment.21 Note the close relationship with cooperativeness. There are two main differences: 
(i) cooperativeness by a player with power from authority includes distributional issues, 
which are absent in our efficiency measure and (ii) excluding players will lower efficiency.  
 In the absence of any kind of power, efficiency is higher when ostracism is available as a 
disciplining mechanism (nAnC vs nAnO; MW, p = 0.078). This is in spite of the fact that 
efficiency may be lost if subjects are excluded. The increased cooperation observed with 
ostracism thus dominates the cost of excluding players. This is different when players have 
power from authority: then, ostracism does not increase NEG despite the observed increase in 
cooperativeness (AnO vs AnC; MW, p = 1.000). This is because almost all center players are 
excluded at some point. 
 Table 3 also shows that NEG is lower when center players are given power from 
authority. When ostracism is unavailable, giving center players only authority reduces NEG 
(AnO vs nAnO; MW, p = 0.025). This is because, as observed above, periphery players 
cooperate significantly less in this environment. With ostracism, we again observe that 
adding authority reduces NEG, both with and without centrality (AnC vs nAnC; MW, p = 
0.007 and AC vs nAC; MW, p = 0.055). Thus, authority is always detrimental to efficiency. 
As seen above, this arises through two channels. First, while authority does not affect the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 As defined in Section 3, 𝜙! measures the increase in earnings over and above the Nash equilibrium earnings. 
Summary statistics on absolute earnings themselves are presented in Appendix B. 
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cooperativeness of the center players, it reduces the cooperativeness of the periphery players. 
Second, when center players have power from authority, periphery players often ostracize 
them, and early in the game. Both factors reduce the surplus that groups (can) generate, thus 
reducing efficiency. 
In contrast, centrality is not harmful for efficiency. Compared to a situation with no 
power (nAnC), the addition of centrality (nAC) somewhat increases NEG, though this 
increase is not statistically significant (MW, p = 0.150). Adding centrality to authority also 
raises NEG, but again not significantly so (AC vs AnC; MW, p = 0.262). Finally, replacing 
power from authority with power from centrality significantly increases NEG (nAC vs AnC; 
MW, p = 0.007). 
 
Result 6:  
(a) In the absence of power, ostracism raises efficiency. In the presence of power from 
authority, ostracism does not affect efficiency. 
 (b) Power from authority lowers efficiency.  
(c) Power from centrality does not affect efficiency. 
 
Result 6 provides mixed support for hypothesis 6. Result 6(a) partly supports hypothesis 6(a); 
ostracism raises efficiency in the absence of power (as hypothesized) but not in the presence 
of power from authority (where an increase was expected). Result 6(b) supports hypothesis 
6(b), while result 6(c) provides no support for the corresponding hypothesis. 
 
5 Discussion and conclusions 
We study the impact of power asymmetry on cooperation in classic social dilemmas in a 
controlled laboratory experiment. We systematically vary power along two dimensions: 
Table 3. Net Efficiency Gain  
  No Authority Authority 
No Ostracism (⇒  no Centrality) 
nAnO 
0.521 (0.075) 
AnO 
0.358 (0.112) 
Ostracism 
No Centrality 
nAnC 
0.636 (0.140) 
AnC 
0.378 (0.171) 
Centrality 
nAC 
0.705 (0.052) 
AC 
0.487 (0.195) 
Notes. Cells give mean net efficiency gain with standard deviation in parentheses. The unit of analysis is the 
matching group.  	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centrality and authority. We replicate standard results for social dilemmas without power 
heterogeneity, including the positive effect that ostracism has on cooperativeness. We add to 
this literature the general finding that both sources of power matter, albeit in different ways.  
 We expected players with authority to take advantage of their position. In the 
presence of (some) cooperative players, those with power are likely to be excluded, even 
when they behave cooperatively. In theory, players with authority expect this. They therefore 
take advantage of their position for as long as they can. We find support for only part of this 
hypothesis: the analysis of the voting data reveals that players with authority receive votes for 
exclusion. This occurs even when they behave cooperatively. In fact, in the absence of 
ostracism, players without authority cooperate even less than those with this power and in the 
presence of ostracism, they all cooperate equally in early rounds. Hence, it is not so much 
that theft of surplus is not tolerated for those with power from authority, but more that this 
kind of power is not tolerated at all.  
As for power from centrality, in the treatments without authority, most of our 
hypotheses are supported. In the presence of (some) cooperative players, excluding central 
players is more costly than excluding periphery players. Indeed, we observe that players with 
power from centrality cooperate significantly less than those without power. It seems that our 
subjects realize that when one player has power from centrality, she enables higher returns 
for the rest of the group simply by being there. Excluding the central player immediately 
reduces the group to at most two players and thus drastically reduces the surplus that can 
possibly be generated. Our results on positive discrimination in terms of exclusion rates 
provide direct evidence that this ‘theft’ is ‘tolerated’ by the others. This is akin to the finding 
that in a democracy “... having the opportunity to throw the rascals out does not necessarily 
mean that such capacity will be exerted” (de Sousa and Moriconi, 2013, p. 474). 
Interestingly, this tolerated theft does no harm to the group as a whole: efficiency is not 
significantly different from the case without power.  
 Even more remarkable, perhaps, is the case when both types of power co-exist (AC). 
Here, it is more costly to ostracize the center player than when there is no power from 
centrality.22 While center players are ostracized less frequently in AC than in AnC, they are 
still ostracized much more frequently than periphery players. Moreover, they are ostracized 
more frequently despite the fact that they are as cooperative as periphery players. This again 
suggests that center players with authority might simply be reviled in their groups and are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 In AnC, exclusion of the center player leaves the periphery in groups of four, where they participate in a 
VCM. In AC, it results in pairs of periphery players in a VCM. 
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thus discriminated against. This is the reverse of tolerated theft; even not taking advantage of 
the position is punished. Periphery players seem to be so averse to players with authority that 
they are willing to bear the cost of a dramatically reduced surplus. In sum, we find that power 
from authority has negative effects on both cooperation and efficiency. 
Our results for the case with power from authority are of particular interest in relation 
to the literature on leadership in social dilemmas, which generally finds a positive effect of 
leadership on cooperation within groups (e.g., Güth et al. 2007; van der Heijden et al. 2009; 
Stoddard et al. 2014). Our results point to the possibility that the frame of leadership might be 
a crucial factor in determining the effectiveness of ‘leadership’ in groups. Unlike the works 
mentioned above, the leaders with authority in our groups decide on their own share first. The 
remainder is then shared out among the rest of the players. While the final division may not 
be different (indeed, we find that players with authority are often quite cooperative), this 
move order might be perceived as exploitative by the rest of the group. This alone could 
cause resentment among those without power, thus leading to lower cooperation.23,24 While 
this move order seems natural, our results suggest that legitimacy of the authority might be 
crucial in determining success in groups.25 Our results on ostracism indicate that this is 
indeed the case. We find overwhelmingly that our subjects do not want an exogenously 
appointed leader with authority, even when she is at least as cooperative as those who vote 
her out. By ostracizing the authority almost immediately in many cases, players without 
power do not even allow leadership a sporting chance of success. In future research we aim to 
further explore this intolerance towards authority by varying the perceived legitimacy of this 
kind of power. 
Similarly, our results also shed new light on the positive effects of ostracism on 
cooperation in social dilemmas. Cinyabuguma et al. (2005) clearly established that the threat 
of exclusion can enhance efficiency. Our results show that this may not necessarily hold 
when there is power asymmetry. When there is power from authority, efficiency is not 
affected by the introduction of ostracism.  
Our experiments are the first to show in a controlled setting that power can provide a 
license to free ride. They also show, however, that this does not hold for all kinds of power. 
We observe tolerated theft when power stems from centrality, but not when power is derived 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 This is also observed in the King treatment in Cox et al. (2013). 
24 In addition, our ‘leader’ cannot discriminate among the periphery players in the group. Whether this may 
affect perceived cooperativeness is an issue we leave for future research. 
25 For a discussion on the legitimacy of a centralized sanctioning authority in groups, see Baldassari and 
Grossman (2011); and Markussen et al. (2014). They find that a democratically instituted mechanism is more 
successful in raising contributions than one that is exogenously imposed.  
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from authority. The behavioral effect that power from centrality leads to free riding in our 
experiments suggests that the truism that power corrupts has some ground. However, in the 
world outside of the laboratory both power from centrality and power from authority exist. 
Our results show that validity of the truism may depend on the type of power concerned. In 
this study, we looked at one mechanism that might limit the negative effects of power. 
However, various mechanisms may have evolved, ranging from elections that allow for the 
dismissal of politicians to anti-corruption laws. Another interesting avenue for future research 
would be to explore further such mechanisms in the laboratory.  
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Appendix A: Summary of the experimental instructions 
Below are the summaries of the instructions as it was handed out to the participants in the 
experiment. Full instructions for all treatments are available on 
www.borisvanleeuwen.nl/ACinstructionsfull.pdf. Each paragraph that was included only in 
some treatments starts with <treatment acronym>. 
 
Summary of instructions 
Welcome to this experiment on decision-making. You will be paid € 7 for your participation 
plus whatever you earn in the experiment. 
 
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate. If you have any questions at 
any time, please raise your hand. An experimenter will assist you privately. You will record 
your decisions privately and anonymously at your computer terminal. Other participants will 
never be able to link you with your personal decisions or earnings from the experiment.  
 
During the experiment, all earnings are denoted in points. At the end of the experiment, 
your earnings will be converted to euros at the rate: 60 points = € 1.  
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The experiment consists of 5 blocks. Each block consists of 5 rounds. At the end of the 
experiment, one block will be randomly selected and everyone will be paid for their 
decisions in that block. 
 
The composition of the groups will remain the same for the 5 rounds in a block. At the end of 
a block, participants will randomly be divided into new groups of five. 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, each participant will randomly be assigned a position - 
North (N), East (E), South (S), West (W) or Center (C). These positions will remain fixed 
throughout the experiment. For example, if you are assigned the North position, you will be 
in the north position in each round in each block of the experiment. 
 
At the beginning of each round, each participant receives an endowment of 50 points. You 
decide on how much of this endowment to invest in each of two accounts. These are called 
a "private account" and a "group account". You may invest everything in the private account, 
everything in the group account, or any combination of the two, as long as you invest 50 
points in total. 
 
Your earnings include earnings both from your private account and the group account: 
 
• Earnings from your private account: You will earn 1 point for each point invested 
in your private account. 
• <nAnO, nAnC, nAC> Earnings from the group account: Your earnings from the 
group account are based on the total number of points invested in the group account 
by all members in your group. Each group member will earn 0.6 points for each 
point in the group account regardless of who made the investment. 
• <AnO, AnC, AC> Earnings from the group account: First, the total number of 
points invested in the group account by all group members is determined. Then, 
this is multiplied by 3. Finally, the group member in the center (C) determines 
how to divide the total amount. S/he determines how much to keep for her- or 
himself. The remainder is equally divided among the other group members. 
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<nAnC, nAC, AnC, AC> Exclusion of a member means that this player can no longer invest 
in the group account and will not receive any earnings from the group account in the 
remaining rounds. The excluded participant will receive an endowment of 50 points in each 
of the remaining rounds in the block. All 50 points will automatically be invested in the 
private account.  
 
<AnC> If someone is excluded, your earnings from the group account will depend on the 
total points invested in the group account by participants in your sub-group alone. The 
amount in the group account will now be multiplied by a factor of 0.6 x (number of sub-
group members). If the Center is not excluded, she decides on how much to keep for 
her/himself and how much to divide equally among the other sub-group members. If the 
Center is excluded, the amount in the group account is equally divided between the remaining 
sub-group members.  
 
<AC> If someone is excluded, your earnings from the group account will depend on the 
total points invested in the group account by participants in your sub-group alone. The 
amount in the group account will now be multiplied by a factor of 0.6 x (number of sub-
group members). If the Center is not excluded, she decides on how much to keep for 
her/himself and how much to divide equally among the other sub-group members. If the 
Center is excluded, the amount in the group account is equally divided between the remaining 
sub-group members. You will not earn anything from the group account investments of 
participants in other sub-groups.  
 
<nAnC, nAC, AnC, AC> To decide on who will be excluded, the group members will select 
candidates for exclusion. 
 
<nAnC, nAC, AnC, AC> You can indicate for each member of your (sub-)group whether 
or not you think that s/he should be excluded from the group in future rounds in the 
current block. You can vote for as many or as few participants as you want.  
 
<nAnC, nAC, AnC, AC> If some member(s) of the group have previously been excluded, 
you can only vote on excluding members of the sub-group you are in. Participants who 
previously have been excluded cannot vote for the exclusion of others. 
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<nAnC, nAC, AnC, AC> If half or more members of the (sub-)group vote to exclude a 
participant, that participant will be excluded in future rounds in the current block.  
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Appendix B: Additional figures and tables  
 
 
Figure B1. Mean contributions by position  
 
Notes. The three panels on the left denote the treatments without authority and the three panels on the right 
show the cases with authority. For each round, contributions are averaged across five blocks. The graphs are 
based on decisions by individuals who are not excluded from their group and who are not isolated.	  
Figure B2. Mean return rates 
 
Notes. The three panels denote the treatments with authority. For each round, return rates are averaged 
across five blocks. The graphs are based on decisions by individuals who are not excluded from their group 
and who are not isolated.	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Table B1. Mean cooperation  
   No Authority Authority 
No Ostracism (⇒  no Centrality) 
 
All players 
Center 
Periphery 
nAnO 
0.521 (0.075) 
0.533 (0.112) 
0.518 (0.076) 
AnO 
0.392 (0.105) 
0.464 (0.124) 
0.375 (0.103) 
Ostracism 
No Centrality 
 
All players 
Center 
Periphery 
nAnC 
0.699 (0.115) 
0.692 (0.136) 
0.701 (0.110) 
AnC 
0.651 (0.099) 
0.497 (0.169) 
0.689 (0.101) 
Centrality 
 
All players 
Center 
Periphery 
nAC 
0.756 (0.057) 
0.694 (0.091) 
0.771 (0.054) 
AC 
0.670 (0.105) 
0.645 (0.161) 
0.677 (0.098) 
Notes. Cells give mean cooperation (𝛾) with standard deviations in parentheses. Entries based on all rounds 
and blocks, and players that were not excluded or isolated. The unit of analysis is the matching group. 	  
Table B2. Mean earnings  
   No Authority Authority 
No Ostracism (⇒  no Centrality) 
 
All players 
Center 
Periphery 
nAnO 
102.1 (7.5) 
101.5 (8.2) 
102.3 (7.6) 
AnO 
98.7 (8.9) 
182.6 (17.3) 
77.7 (12.5) 
Ostracism 
No Centrality 
 
All players 
Center 
Periphery 
nAnC 
113.6 (14.0) 
114.0 (14.4) 
113.5 (14.1) 
AnC 
100.3 (13.7) 
137.9 (29.7) 
90.8 (10.3) 
Centrality 
 
All players 
Center 
Periphery 
nAC 
120.5 (5.2) 
124.0 (5.6) 
119.6 (5.4) 
AC 
109.0 (15.6) 
163.4 (26.4) 
95.4 (17.5) 
Notes. Cells give mean earnings per round in points, with standard deviations in parentheses. Entries based 
on all rounds and blocks, and all players, regardless of being excluded or isolated. The unit of analysis is the 
matching group. 	  
